The U.S. dairy industry is claimed to be unique in that it is subject to more regulation than any other agricultural industry (Hallberg and Fallert, p. 3) . Whether the dairy industry is subject to more or less regulation than any other particular agricultural industry is not important. For our purposes, it is sufficient only to agree that the dairy industry is highly regulated. It is the purpose of this paper to formulate a model and estimate the interregional transfers and welfare losses created by the current regulatory structure imposed on U . S. dairy markets.
Given the degree of dairy market regulation, it would be useful to summarize the regulation that is unique to dairying. Sanitary grading was established by regulation to differentiate raw milk by its quality or condition ofproduction. Grade A milk is produced under the strictest sanitary conditions and is eligible for fluid, or beverage, consumption. Grade B milk is produced under less strict sanitary conditions and is eligible only to be incorporated into manufactured dairy products such as cheese and butter.
Classified pricing and pooling provisions affect only grade A milk and are established by federal and/or state regulatory agencies. Classified pricing is the practice of establishing different minimum prices for raw grade A milk depending on how the milk is utilized. Grade A milk going into fluid (beverage) utilization receives the higher class I price, while grade A milk going into manufacturing utilization receives a lower class II or class III price. The class I price is typically established as the class III price plus a fixed differential. I Pool-
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I The class 11 price is usually SO. I Olcwt over the class III price.
ing is the practice of distributing the proceeds of grade A sales so that all grade A producers shipping milk into the pool receive the same or average price.
The U.S. dairy industry is also subject to a price support program which is based on the concept of parity (Hallberg and Fallert, p. 11) . The price of raw milk is supported by USDA purchases of manufactured dairy products. This support of wholesale butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk prices is transmitted back to the farm level as higher raw milk prices. In order for price supports to be effective in the United States, import restrictions have been established so the USDA can support domestic dairy prices and producers' incomes without having to support world dairy prices as well.
A final set of regulations that indirectly act . upon the dairy industry consists of those that affect cooperatives. Seventy-five percent of all milk marketed in the United States is marketed through dairy farmers' coops (Jacobson, p . 171) . Any regulation affecting dairy coops thus affects the structure of milk markets.
Literature Review
Ippolito and Masson formulated a national model of the U.S. dairy industry as shown in figure I . U.S. aggregate functions are shown as DF, the derived demand function at the farm level for milk for fluid utilization; SA, the supply function for grade A milk; AR, the average revenue or grade A blend price function due to pooling; DM, the derived demand function at the farm level for milk for manufacturing utilization; S8, the supply function for grade B milk, assumed to be produced mainly in the Minnesota -Wisconsin area; and D/l, the Henceforth, class II and class III utilization wiU both be subsumed under class II utilization. In this case, the competitive solution would be the price-quantity vector, (pr, PlfC, PAf, QN, QfC, Qlr, P/'v;C, QMf, PSC, QflC) .
Copyright 1980 American Agricultural Economics Association
With classified pricing, the minimum class I price PI' is set administratively and results in a solution price-quantity vector, (PI', PII', PAr, QA", QI', QII', PM" , QM", PH', QB') .
The welfare costs of classified pricing and pooling are shown as area A, the lost consumer surplus due to underconsumption of fluid milk; area B, the resource cost due to greater than optimal consumption of manufactured dairy products; area C, the resource cost due to overproduction of grade A milk; and area D, the resource cost due to underproduction of grade B milk. The transfers implicit in this model are area E, the transfers from fluid milk consumers to grade A milk producers; area F, a subsidy from grade A milk producers to manufactured product consumers; and area G, the transfers from grade B milk producers to manufactured product consumers . This model is a generalization of Kessel's earlier grade A model which displayed deadweight losses due to underconsumption of fluid milk, deadweight losses due to overproduction of grade A milk and transfers from fluid milk consumers to grade A milk producers. Blakley and Riley (1974, p. 1, 1975) Another criLicism of all models that indiscriminately use elasticity estimates derived from previous studies is that elasticity estimates from models that ignore the effect of regulation may be seriously biased (Prato, p, 221) . A fourth criticism is not directed toward Ippolito and Masson's work but is directed toward models that assume that in competitive equilibrium the price of grade A milk will equal the price of grade B milk. This assumption is unrealistic as long as there is a cost of production differential between grade A and grade B milk produc- tion. A final problem of measuring the welfare cost of regulation is the exclusion of risk considerations on the part of producers. 2
Mathematical Model of a U. S. Dairy Market
On the demand side, milk is demanded at the farm level for one of two purposes; it is either bottled and sold as beverage milk or it is incorporated into manufactured dairy products. As such, there exist two demand functions for raw milk, fluid demand and manufacturing demand . Demand functions at the farm level are generally specified as 3
where QF is the quantity of fluid milk demanded per day; QM is the quantity of manufacturing milk demanded per day; PF, price paid per hundredweight for milk for fluid utilization ; PM, price paid per hundredweight for milk for manufacturing utilization; Inc, per capita income; Pop, population of the market; Qs , USDA price support purchases (net removals); d, vector of discrete monthly dummy variables to account for environmental and institutional changes over the year; / , trend variable to account for linear changes in the age distribution of the population and for linear' changes in prices not included in the model; Org, discrete variable to account for market reorganizations and mergers ; EF , EM , errors of estimation for the respective demand functions . Farmers supply only two types of milk , either grade A milk or grade B milk. Mathematical optimization of the producers' profit functions subject to the industry production functions for grade A and grade B milk indica tes a general formulation of the supply functions as (PA, PB, Pfd, Phy , Pcw , Pwg , Pin , d, Org , EA) , (4) QB' = QB' (PA , PB , Pfd, Phy , Pcw , Pwg, Pin , d, Org, EB) ,
where QA' is the desired production of grade A milk per day; QB' is the desired production 2 If milk producers are risk·a verse and regulation reduces the variance of milk prices. then the supply function will shift out as a result of regulation. More will be said about this later.
) These general functions may be s pecified as either linear or log· tinear functions . The relationship between the ac tual quantity supplied and the desired quantity supplied can be specified by a linear partial adjustment model
where QA', QB' are defined above ; QA, actual output of grade A milk per day ; QB, actual output of grade B miik per day; a * , b * , respective coefficients of adjustment for grade A and grade B milk production ; VA , VB , errors of estimation for the respective adjustment functions .
These supply models are interdependent in that both the grade A and grade B supply functions contain PA and PB . A great deal of multicollinearity is expected to exist between the grade A and grade B milk prices. The effect of this multicollinearity is minimized by referring to the assumption of constrained profit ma ximization. When this is done, a symmetry restriction emerges which specifies that either
be imposed as a restriction during the estimation of the model where Ey .J: is the elasticity of y with respect tox. Normally, it is preferable to have estimates of elasticities by using double-logarithmic models . The restriction (8) associated with these supply models dictates that the estimation of price slopes is to be preferred to the estimation of elasticities since restriction (8) implies a nonlinear model. The identities associated with this dairy market model are first, total supplies to the market are equal to total demands. Therefore,
Second, grade A farmers will receive the grade A price,
Third, the price paid by processors for milk for fluid utilization is the minimum class I price 4
And finally , all milk going into manufacturing utilization receives the same price regardless of its eligibility, so
Empirical Investigation
Since this effort is concerned with welfare costs within markets and transfers within and between markets, estimation must be performed on individual markets. At the end of ) 976 , fifty federal order markets and seventeen state order markets encompassed 100% of regulated milk deliveries , 97.5% of grade A milk deliveries and 79.0% of all milk deliveries . One possible approach to measuring the desired transfers and welfare losses would be to fit price and quantity data for each of these sixty-seven markets. The time required to collect and analyze the data dictated that a sampling approach be used to draw inferences about the larger population of markets. The ten largest milk markets in the United States in 1976 accounted for two-thirds of total milk deliveries and were included in the sample . Six markets from the set of fifty-seven relatively small markets were drawn at random , subject to geographic stratification. The sixteen markets included in the original sample are listed in table I.
Several modifications were made to the original sample. The California state order market was excluded from estimation because California has a five class system of classified pricing and a complex and restrictive base plan (Milligan) . The model constructed would not provide reliable elasticity estimates of supply and demand parameters in California. Second, North Carolina was included in the sample with unit probability due to the low cost of obtaining data. Finally, the Maine market was
• The actual price paid for fluid milk is frequently the federal order minimum plus an over·order premium. This over-order premium reflects the cost of services performed by cooperatives, the COSt of obtaining alternative supplies, and any supracompetitive premIum . The assumption of the constancy and independence of this over-order premium and the error of the fluid equation was utilized . The class I minimum price was then a proxy for PF.
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excluded due to nonresponse in data collection_ Estimation was performed using monthly time-series data from 1968-77 for the fourteen markets . All quantities were converted to per day flows to correct for different length months while all prices were deflated by the consumer price index. Not all 120 observations were used for every market as market reorganizations with few observations on the reorganized market sometimes resulted in unrealistic elasticity estimates. Table 1 lists a summary of elasticity estimates by market.
The purpose of sampling subject to geographic stratification was to measure possible regional and market size effects on elasticities of the form
where EQ ,p is a general elasticity of some quantity Q with respect to some price P. PI is the effect of regional strata i, crj is the effect of size strataj. and ~IJ is the error of measurement. By use of least squares, p.. Pi. and iT j were estimated and these values were then used to generate a set of predicted values for EQ ,p for all markets not in the sample_ The least-squares procedure generally provided a poor description of the elasticities estimated in the sampling step as none of the I-values for PI and cTJ were significant at the 0.10 probability level. Also, the predicted values generated by the regression model were frequently of the wrong sign. Given the insignificance of the size and regional effects, these effects were assumed to be zero and a value for each elasticity was found that is uniform across all markets. The value chosen was the mean of all the parameter estimates after severe outliers had been deleted. The resulting estimates are given at the bottom of table 1 and were assumed to apply to all markets both within and outside the sample.
Computation of the welfare costs and interregional transfers resulting from regulation requires a model of unregulated equilibrium, To model the United States dairy industry in the absence of regulation , a reacti ve programming model was developed using 1976 milk-marketing and utilization data. Sixty-seven fluid markets corresponding to the state and federal order markets and seventy-five manufacturing markets were identified in terms of prices, quantities, and geographical coordinates. Supply areas were assigned geographically as states and likewise were identified by prices, • AU markets are federal order markets unless otherwise specified.
• Only negative estimates are included in the calculation of the mean. , Only positive estimates are included in the calculation of the mean. quanthies, and geographical coordinates. Both the supply and the demand areas were then aggregated into regions. Distances between supply and demand regions were computed (see Tramel and Seale) and converted to transportation costs us ing the formula given by Lough (p. 18) . Manufacturing milk transportation costs were computed as the cost of shipping the fluid milk equivalent in manufactured products and were computed to hold the same proportional relationship to fluid transportation costs as in Hallberg et al. Fluid and manufacturing demand regions were assumed to have an elasticity of demand equal to -0.112 and -0.352, respectively. Since grade A and grade B production are interdependent, it was assumed that in an unregulated environment the fall in the grade A price and the rise in the grade B price would cause grade A producers to convert to grade B production until the cost of production differential was _ attained and total manufacturing demand was supplied out of grade B production. In terms of the modeling effort, this assumption was incorporated by using a total supply function and the assumption that, in unregulated equilibrium, the grade B price would be below the grade A price by the cost of production differential, $0.15 per hundredweight [Ippolito and Masson (citing Bartlett) , p. 37] . The elasticity of the total supply function was specified with respect to the grade A price since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the grade A price and the grade B price in unregulated equilibrium. Specifically, since which was the assumed elasticity of total milk supplies with respect to the grade A price. s In order to have grade B prices the required $0. 15 per hundredweight below grade A prices in the final solution, manufacturing demand was inflated by 1.5% to give manufacturing demand in terms of the grade A price. When the solution was obtained. the manufacturing demand function, which was formulated in terms of the grade A price, corresponded to the true manufacturing demand function, which was formulated in terms of the grade B price. The difference between these manufacturing demand functions was the required $0.15 per hundredweight. The reactive program was initialized at the 1976 actual prices and quantities and converged to equilibrium according to the assumptions outlined above .
Results
While total milk quantities, expenditures. and receipts will change relatively little with the presence or absence of regulation, the allocation of production between grade A and grade B producers will vary dramatically (table 2). 
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The effect of regulation in terms of tax rates on fluid milk consumption and grade B milk production and in terms of subsidy rates on the production of manufactured goods is recorded in table 3. The effect of regulation is not as clear-cut on grade A prices. Generally, regulation imposes a tax on grade A production in the upper Midwest, northern Great Plains, and California regions while subsidizing grade A production in all other regions . Changes in economic surpluses also are recorded in table 3. These surplus changes are as predicted by the model and are a function of the implied tax rates. These surplus changes are also quite large and are composed of the indicated transfers and deadweight losses. The deadweight losses due to the misallocation of consumption (columns A and B) are generally small because of the inelasticity of demand . Given the construction of the supply response for the model, dead-weight losses in production were redefined from the areas C and D shown in figure I . The social costs due · to resource misallocation between milk and all other production are recorded in column C and the social costs due to resource misallocation within milk production are recorded in column 0, both in table 3.
The total deadweight losses were estimated as $96.8 million, the bulk of which comes from the production of grade A surpluses in a regulated environment. By comparison, Kwoka estimated $179 million to be the welfare losses of dairy market regulation and $750 million to be transferred from fluid milk consumers to. grade A milk producers (corresponding to column E) for 1970 . For 1973, Ippolito and Masson estimated total deadweight losses to be roughly $26 million per year, administrative costs to be roughly $34 million per year , and transfers corresponding to columns E , F, and G to be $334 million, $121 million and $105 million, respectively. As was pointed out by Ippolito a nd Masson, in addition to the deadweight losses due to regulation, the costs of administering the system must be added to determine the total social costs due to regulation. 6 Using the Ippolito and Masson administrative cost estimates of $34 million, the total social cost of dairy market regulation can be found to be $131 million for 1976. This $131 million includes the cost of both the price sup-Amer. 1. Agr. Econ . port program which purchased 1.9% of total manufacturing utilization in 1976 and the classified pricing and pooling program. If price support purchases had been greater, driving dairy markets farther away from the assumed unregulated equilibrium, the computed deadweight losses would have been larger.
Stability is one alleged benefit of dairy market regulation in that one result of regulation is the creation of grade A surpluses which insulate retail milk prices from the effect of annual supply and demand cycles. The model formulated to estimate transfers and deadweight losses does not provide a cushion for the short side of the grade A supply relative to the fluid demand cycle . However , the estimated supply and demand functions for the fourteen sample markets allowed the estimation of the mismatch between the grade A supply cycle and the fluid demand cycle. At constant prices, the maximum grade A shortfall of 9.0% occurred in the month of October, while the maximum grade A surplus of 13 .0% occurred in the month of June. A 9.0% annual grade A surplus , which is sufficient to cover the short months was calculated to cost $7 .0 million ($0.15/cwt x 9.0% x grade A supply) .
Another frequently argued benefit of regulation is that regulation reduces the price risk for producers and the supply function shifts outward as a result of regulation. While the existence of this phenomenon is open to investigation, there are two implicit assumptions; first, that dairy farmers are risk-averse and second, regulation does indeed reduce the price variance. The testing of these assumptions will be left to a later time.
The supply structure in unregulated equilibrium was assumed to be the same as the observed supply structure in regulated equilibrium . The question asked of the model was how far must this supply structure have shifted out because of regulation in order for consumer surplus gains to offset the deadweight losses . It was found that if the regulated supply function had shifted out by 1.54% or more, then the deadweight losses would have been more than offset by the consumer surplus gains. The issue again becomes clouded by the possibility that regulation merely shifts risk from grade A to grade B producers . Given the level of belief in the stabilizing effect of dairy market regulation, the study of the existence of this effect and its relationship to producers' output decisions deserves more attention in the years to come. 
